



SUNZI
THE ART OF WAR

ILLUSTRATED BY
C. C. TSAI

FOREWORD BY
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
AUTHOR OF STRATEGY: A HISTORY

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THE ART OF WAR

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Sunzi

THE ART OF WAR

Adapted and illustrated by

C. C. Tsai

Translated by Brian Bruya

Foreword by Lawrence Freedman

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Contents

<i>Foreword by Lawrence Freedman</i>	vii	On the Battlefield	39
<i>Introduction by Brian Bruya</i>	xi	Powers of the Commander	42
		Know Yourself, Know Your Enemy	45
THE LIFE OF SUN WU	2		
1. CALCULATION	10	4. TACTICAL DISPOSITION	47
Calculation	11	Conditions for Attack and Defense	48
The Dao, Heaven, Earth, Command, Law	12	Seek Victory before Fighting	51
The Dao	13	The Circumstances of Decisive Battle	53
Heaven	14	5. FORCE	55
Earth	15	Frontal and Surprise	56
Command	16	Interchanging Frontal and Surprise Attacks	57
Law	17	Force	60
The Seven Calculations	18	Creating Force	61
Subterfuge	20	6. STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS	63
Taking Advantage of the Enemy	21	Control Others Instead of	
Calculating Victory	22	Being Controlled	64
2. WAGING WAR	23	Concentration against Fragmentation	66
A Million Dollars a Day	24	Like Water	67
Protracted War Is Disadvantageous	25	7. MANEUVER	70
Victory, Not Duration	26	Make the Crooked Straight	71
Gain Strength through the Enemy	27	Advantage and Disadvantage	72
The General Who Knows	30	Wind, Forest, Fire, Mountain	75
3. OFFENSIVE STRATEGY	31	8. FLEXIBILITY	78
Sending Troops into the Field	32	Flexibility	79
Multiple Fronts	34		

9. ON THE MARCH	86	Wage War Like a Serpent	110
Deployment	87	Like a Maiden	113
10. TERRAIN	94	12. INCENDIARY WARFARE	114
Terrain	95	Five Methods of Incendiary Warfare	115
The Six Causes of Defeat	99	Move Only when It Benefits You	116
A Great General Is a National Treasure	101	13. ESPIONAGE	118
11. GROUND	102	Spies	119
Strategies of Ground	103	The Five Agents	121
Dividing the Enemy	107		
The Army of the Supreme Sovereign	109	<i>Pronunciation Index</i>	127

Foreword

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Sunzi's *The Art of War* is one of the great works of strategy. It represents a coherent approach to all forms of conflict, and the underlying principles are of wide application. Although the focus is on war, and military considerations are to the fore, political and economic considerations are always kept in view. It was addressed to commanders fighting wars in China some 2,400 years ago, yet the advice still appears relevant to anyone caught up in a conflict and seeking to come out on top. This is why Sunzi is now read as much in political and business as in military circles. *The Art of War* also has the advantage of being relatively short. Some of the allusions may seem obscure, but C. C. Tsai's vivid cartoons help explain their meaning as well as bring to life Sunzi's key themes.

Was Sunzi (Master Sun), this wise and successful general, a real person? The consensus view now is that he was, and that he was active around 550 BCE to 500 BCE. This is known as China's Spring & Autumn Period, a time of regular and vicious wars between rival states, when alliances and enmities were fluid. He was said to have served King Helü of Wu who fought regular battles with the neighboring state of Chu, and helped him prevail in a number of battles, including the decisive battle of Boju (506 BCE), although he is not actually mentioned in any of the more authoritative histories. The thirteen sections of the book were put together in the following Warring States Period (481 BCE to 403 BCE), when it acquired its reputation as an essential text for military practitioners. In CE 1080, Emperor Shenzong of Song identified *The Art of War* as the most important of seven classic military texts. This is therefore a book that

has helped shape the broad thrust of Chinese strategic thought through the centuries.

It is obviously a challenge for a Western reader to get close to the original meaning and to pick up on all the subtleties. No translation of an ancient script can be straightforward, and there are disagreements about how some words and phrases should be understood. In addition, the book emerged out of a particular spiritual and intellectual context. Greater insights can be expected with more intense study of the origins of the text and the significance of individual words.¹ Yet *The Art of War* has a timeless appeal, speaking to contemporary concerns. Even when it has been taken out of context it can still be read with profit, reminding us of some of the constants of human behavior as well as the changes. As with other great works from centuries ago, it can accommodate a number of interpretations and prompt thoughts relevant to a contemporary reader's immediate concerns.

The distinctive quality of *The Art of War* is that it offers a pure form of strategy with many potential applications. It is holistic in the range of factors it can take into account, expedient in responding to new developments, and yet also conducted with a clear framework of priorities and principles. Unlike in much Western writing on the topic, strategy does not appear as a fixed plan, set at the start of a campaign and pursued regardless of changing circumstances. When addressing issues of war, it does not consider political, economic, military, and geographical factors as separate strands. Instead, the stress is on their interaction in a dynamic setting. There is no suggestion,

for example, that victory should come at any price. When costs are disregarded in pursuit of short-term advantages, a whole campaign might come to a grinding halt because the funds have run out. Close attention is also paid to alliances. Perhaps an army is strong enough to take on all comers, but its task becomes much easier if its coalition is extended or if the enemy loses its partners.

This approach opens up possibilities that are missed by the single-minded focus on battle that is a feature of so much Western strategic thought. Sunzi understands that battles use up strength and carry risks. He would far rather get the enemy into a hopeless position when it has little choice but to surrender or accept slaughter. Deception therefore plays a prominent role in his schema. Much of his advice comes down to doing the opposite of what the enemy is expecting: retreat when he is preparing for an advance, advance when he expects retreat, look strong when he thinks you are weak and weak when he fears you are strong, and so on. Sunzi wants to play on character flaws as much as unwise dispositions. A commander who is prone to anger, for example, should be taunted into rash decisions. To make deception work, it is vital to know as much as possible about the enemy's strengths and weaknesses. Espionage is therefore an important part of this approach, and Sunzi is not too fussy about how vital information is obtained.

At the heart of Sunzi's approach is intellectual preparation. *The Art of War* stresses the possibilities of outsmarting in preference to just out-fighting the opponent. It puts a premium on a dispassionate assessment of the risks and possibilities of alternative courses of action, and then acting with confidence once that assessment has been made.

This was the feature that attracted Basil Liddell Hart, who can be credited with being the first Western strategist to incorporate Sunzi into his own thinking.² He contrasted *The Art*

of War with Carl von Clausewitz's *On War*, as he blamed the latter, or at least its more rigid followers, for the persistent, deadly frontal assaults of the First World War. When introduced to Sunzi in 1927 he appreciated the distaste for protracted war and the urge to adopt strategies based more on indirect maneuvers rather than direct confrontations.³ The reputation of *The Art of War* was enhanced because it was known to have been embraced by Mao Zedong in China and Ho Chi Minh in North Vietnam. Both achieved victories despite the initial weaknesses in their positions. Later, not only was the book seen as providing valuable clues to Eastern military thinking but also as an explanation for the competitiveness of Asian businesses.⁴

The Art of War is not without flaws. One of the reasons it has proved to be so durable is that the advice is offered at a high, aspirational level, with very little on what is necessary to make it work. Victory is promised if the right steps are followed properly, but this raises the obvious problem of what happens if the enemy commander is following the exact same steps. When both are disciples of Sunzi, the result could be inconclusive encounters and an impasse. The emphasis on the indirect and implicit at the expense of the direct and explicit could lead to both sides dodging each other rather than risking all-out battle.⁵ Although Sunzi's first priority is to finish a war quickly, there is no guarantee that his strategic approach will avoid protracted war. The focus is also on the offensive rather than the defensive. It is about taking the initiative rather than responding to another's aggression. "If you cannot win, do not go to war." But sometimes there is no choice.

Lastly, it is amoral, celebrating ruthlessness as well as cunning. This perhaps explains why Sunzi has become associated with villains in Western fiction (such as Gordon Gekko and Tony

¹ See Derek M. C. Yuen, *Deciphering Sun Tzu: How to Read the Art of War* (London: Hurst & Co, 2014).

² A Jesuit Father Joseph Amiot published a loose translation in French in 1782. Napoleon might have read it, but there is no indication that it had any major influence on his strategic outlook.

³ See his foreword to Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated and with an introduction by Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

⁴ I discuss the non-military appeal of Sunzi in Lawrence Freedman, *Strategy: A History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 508–10.

⁵ François Jullien, *Detour and Access; Strategies of Meaning in China and Greece*, translated by Sophie Hawkes (New York: Zone Books, 2004), 35, 49–50.

Soprano). Even when he points to the importance of providing a cause worth fighting for and sustaining morale, the suspicion remains that Sunzi would be satisfied with what works. Any work on strategy highlights choices, and these must be

assessed by reference to values as well as effectiveness. As an approach to any conflict, one that avoids lengthy, costly struggles and painful battles by acquiring the best information and analyzing it coolly has much to commend it.

Introduction

BRIAN BRUYA

I. THE BATTLE OF THE HUNDRED SCHOOLS

The Imperial Period in China began in 221 BCE, when the First Emperor, hailing from the far western state of Qin, completed his conquest of China. From that time until 1911, there were six subsequent major dynasties: the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing. But what about before the Qin? For 789 years, from 1045 to 256 BCE (much longer than any subsequent dynasty), a single lineage held the throne as Son of Heaven, ruler of China. This dynasty's name is Zhou (pronounced *joe*—see the Pronunciation Index in the back of the book for how to pronounce other Chinese names and terms). The period of the Zhou that concerns us is the second half, when traditional order had broken down.

The traditional order was unique among world civilizations. The Zhou Dynasty begins with the victors over the preceding Shang Dynasty fanning out across the country, taking control of key cities and towns—over 150 in total. We can think of each of these newly formed states as a fief, loyal to the Zhou king. Each enfeoffed ruler had local control but served at the pleasure of the king: visiting the king regularly to renew bonds of fealty, sending tribute to the king, and doing the king's bidding when necessary. Each fief was handed down to the ruler's eldest son. In the beginning, these fiefs were close, either in terms of familial relationships or in terms of military loyalty, and the relationship between king and vassal was viewed as like that between father and son. Over time, however, disputes arose, loyalties frayed, and battles occurred. 250 years in, and ties were stretched to the breaking point.

A traditional story (perhaps apocryphal) is often used to illustrate a key turning point in the dynasty. In 773 BCE, the king had just divorced his primary wife and replaced her with his favorite, who was difficult to please. In order to entertain her, the king arranged for a large feast on the outskirts of the capital, and at nightfall he had the warning beacons on the city wall lit. The beacons went up in flame one after another in a spectacular display that reached to the horizon, and after several hours, troops from neighboring states arrived breathless at the capital to bring aid to the king, whom they thought was in grave danger from invasion. The spectacle delighted the queen, but of course the generals and soldiers who had rushed to help were not amused. This happened more than once.

Not long after, the state of Shen, which nursed a grudge against the king, allied with the Quan Rong tribe and attacked the Zhou capital. When the Zhou warning beacons were lit, the neighboring states ignored them. The capital was laid waste, and the king was killed. The Zhou lineage was allowed to continue, but it was forced to move its capital east, its area of direct control was reduced, and it lost the fealty of the major vassals. From that point on, the various states quickly realized it was every state for itself. For the next five and a half centuries the states gradually swallowed each other up until only seven major states remained at the end of the Spring & Autumn Period (770–481 BCE). As armies increased in size during the Warring States Period (481–221 BCE), the disruption of warfare increased as well. The battle for ultimate supremacy continued until Qin was the last state standing.

In this battle for ultimate supremacy it would no longer do for a ruler to simply rely on his circle of close nobility to act as generals and ministers. Every ruler needed the most capable people around. And so an intellectual ferment began. Not only did rulers look beyond the nobility for brains and talent but people of brains and talent began to promote their own views about how best to govern—theories that blossomed to include all kinds of associated philosophical concerns. Over time, similar lines of thinking coalesced into a variety of schools of thought, such as Confucianism, Mohism, Legalism, Daoism, and so on. The Chinese refer to it as the period of the contending voices of a hundred schools of thought.

The first major Confucian text was the *Analects* of Confucius, a handbook for creating a flourishing society through cultural education and strong moral leadership. Mencius, a student of Confucius' grandson, Zisi, was the second major Confucian thinker. His influential book, *The Mencius*, uses memorable analogies and thought experiments (such as the child on the edge of a well) to drive home subtle points about the goodness of human nature and effective governing. Two short pieces that were important to the revival of Confucianism in the Song Dynasty were also products of this time. They are *Advanced Education* (*Da Xue*) and *The Middle Path* (*Zhong Yong*), traditionally attributed to Confucius' student Zengzi and to Zisi, respectively. *Advanced Education* offers a pithy formula for the self-development of caring, world-class leaders, while *The Middle Path* discusses how to achieve balance both internally and externally.

While the Confucians concentrated on creating moral leaders, others, known to us now as Daoists, preferred to concentrate on becoming as close as possible to the natural way of things. The major Daoist texts from this period are the *Zhuangzi* and Laozi's *Daodejing*. The *Zhuangzi* is one of the great works of world literature, simultaneously a profound philosophical study of metaphysics, language, epistemology, and ethics. It's also loads of fun to read for its colorful characters and paradoxical stories. Laozi's *Daodejing* echoes many themes of the *Zhuangzi*, with an emphasis on the sage as leader, non-action, and emptying the mind. Its poetic language and spare style

stand it in stark contrast to the *Zhuangzi* but also allow for a richness of interpretation that has made it a favorite of contemplative thinkers across traditions. A third Daoist from this time period, Liezi, had his name placed on a book a few centuries later. The *Liezi* adopts the style and themes of the *Zhuangzi* and continues the whimsical yet profound tradition.

Other thinkers concentrated on ruthless efficiency in government and came to be known as Legalists. One major Legalist thinker was Han Feizi. His book, the *Han Feizi*, condemns ideas from other schools of thought that had devolved into practices that were considered wasteful, corrupt, and inefficient. In response, he speaks directly to the highest levels of leadership, using Daoist terminology and fable-like stories to make his points, advising rulers on how to motivate people, how to organize the government and the military, and how to protect their own positions of power.

Still other thinkers concentrated their theories on military strategy and tactics. The major representative of this genre is, of course, Sunzi, and his classic *The Art of War*, a text that so profoundly and succinctly examines how to get the greatest competitive advantage with the least harm done that it is still read today by military leaders and captains of industry.

The political, military, and intellectual battles continued throughout the Warring States Period in a complex interplay until Han Feizi's version of Legalism seemed to tip the balance for the Qin. But the victory was short-lived, and soon a version of Confucianism would rise to the top as the preferred philosophy of political elites. But Daoism, and later Buddhism, had their own periods of dominance and influenced many aspects of Chinese culture over the centuries.

II. SUNZI AND HIS IDEAS

As with many ancient Chinese classics, we don't have a good sense of the original author of this book. In this illustrated version, C. C. Tsai begins by illustrating a key episode in the life of Sunzi that comes from a history of the period but dates to several centuries after Sunzi is said to have lived. We don't know how reliable it is, and although there are quite a few other

historical accounts of the times in which Sunzi is said to have lived, they don't mention him. There is another problem, as well: Sunzi is said to have lived at about the time of Confucius, toward the end of the Spring & Autumn Period, but there are a number of passages in *The Art of War* that reference conditions that did not occur until a couple of centuries later. This suggests that either the book was written later or was revised later. Commentators on the book throughout Chinese history have often remarked on other problems with the book's organization. Some passages appear out of place or read like comments or explanations that later copyists inadvertently incorporated into the text. All in all, it's not a good idea to focus too much attention on the author of the book or on stitching every piece together into a unified argument. Fortunately, in this version C. C. has stitched together all of the key lines of thinking, very close to the order presented in the original text, giving us a nice, well-ordered flow of ideas.

There are many pairs of conceptual opposites used in traditional European philosophy that we don't commonly see in Chinese philosophy, such as: spirit/matter, fact/value, mind/body, reason/emotion, and so on. But the Chinese have their own interesting conceptual pairings, one of which sets the idea of *wen* 文 against the idea of *wu* 武. *Wu* means pertaining to warfare or other kinds of violent conflict. (Add the word *shu* 術 [art] to it, and you get the Chinese word for martial arts.) *Wen* is more difficult to define. On the one hand, *wen* means high culture, like literature and art. On the other hand, *wen* suggests the morality and etiquette of civil society. Ideally, culture and morality contribute to each other in the education and growth of a person. Moral people educate themselves in cultural pursuits, refining their powers of sensitivity and understanding. Cultured people reflect on their social roles, with the goal of self-improvement and the betterment of others.

Traditionally in China, *wen* and *wu* were opposites, like fire and water—they don't go well together but each has its indispensable utility. *Wen* refers to the quality of the people who create a moral, cultured society, and *wu* implies a threat to some part of that society. The Prussian military strategist Carl von Clausewitz famously said that war is politics by other means,

meaning that the aims of war and politics are the same: exerting one's will over others. During the Warring States Period, there were plenty of kings and aspiring kings who would have agreed with Clausewitz and who were willing to gain and extend their power by any means necessary. There were others, however, who pondered a little more deeply. To some of them, war and politics were altogether different. Politics is about the organization of society. War is what happens when social organization has broken down.

A statement by a nobleman of Chu, who lived several decades ahead of the time Sunzi is said to have lived, illustrates this idea. The nobleman had just won a significant victory on the battlefield, but instead of being pleased, he regretfully acknowledges the damage he has caused. In a written record of the time, he begins with an analysis of the character *wu* 武, saying that it is composed of the two characters *zhi* 止 and *ge* 戈. *Zhi* means to stop, and a *ge* is a dagger-axe (a popular weapon of the time), so *wu*, he says, means to stop fighting, rather than being about the glorification of fighting. He continues:

Wu should be used to suppress brutality and lay down weapons. It should preserve wholeness, allow confidence for work to resume, restore stability and harmony, and rebuild wealth and abundance. . . . If weapons are not laid down and brutality not suppressed, how can wholeness be preserved? With the enemy in our territory, how can there be confidence for work to resume? If the desires of the people are thwarted, how can there be stability? If morals are set aside in conflicts with other noblemen, how can there be harmony? If I pursue honor through selfish motivations and by raining chaos down on people, how can there be wealth and abundance? (*Zuo Zhuan*, Xuan Gong 12)

The nobleman's point is that warfare should be used only to defend or restore social order, not to create or compound disorder just to satisfy the selfish goals of rulers.

A common idea in early China was that things happen in cycles. Think of a wave ~ with peaks and troughs. The peaks are good, harmonious times, and the troughs are

disordered, violent times. *Wen* applies to times closer to the peaks, and *wu* applies to times closer to the troughs. In this sense, *wen* and *wu* are tools used by people for maintaining cosmic order, social order being a fundamental element of cosmic order. The larger progression of events in the cosmos occurs as a matter of transformation from one situation to another. The judicious use of alternating now *wen* and now *wu* in facing these transformations can maintain overall balance so that ultimately the people can thrive. These are ideas that Sunzi inherited, and we can see them on full display in *The Art of War*.

In Chapter 4, we see the idea of tactical disposition. In military terminology, tactical disposition refers to placing soldiers on the battlefield in formations that can be used to improve the odds of victory. For example, a commander might place foot soldiers in the middle, with cavalry on both sides. That's one formation.

One of the most famous formations in Chinese history is the Eight Trigrams formation, said to have been used by the brilliant strategist Zhuge Liang during the Three Kingdoms Period (220–280 BCE). He arranged soldiers in regimented placements in an octagon shape. Well-armored foot soldiers would funnel enemy cavalry toward the octagon. Instead of meeting the enemy head on, the octagon would open up and let them in. After they entered, they would lose their bearings and fall prey to the constantly shifting formations within the octagon.

Our main description of the Eight Trigrams formation comes in a work of historical fiction, so we don't know if it actually existed, but it illustrates the idea of tactical disposition. The Chinese term is *xing* 形, which means shape or form. In its military use, it carries the connotation of being tactical because the formations don't come in just any old form for any old purpose. What makes a disposition, or formation, tactical is not just its form or the make-up of the soldiers or their weapons, but their use. Sunzi emphasizes that you must always work toward your own advantage and toward the enemy's disadvantage. This may sound obvious, but it means waiting and preparing for the right moment to attack. For example, Sunzi says that when attacking an enemy crossing a river, you should wait

until they are halfway across, then you can use the obstacle of the water against them.

Setting up events to your own strategic advantage is called *shi* 勢, which is translated in the book as force, or momentum (see especially Chapter 5). The idea is that there is an accumulation of force that is unleashed all at once, and because of its overwhelming power, it is unstoppable. Images used by Sunzi, and depicted so adeptly by C. C., include a stone striking an egg and a log rolling down a hill. The image with the strongest sense of strategy is the hawk that attacks from above. It remains unseen, waiting, until the opportune moment, and then strikes like lightning, with perfect speed and inescapable accuracy. Sunzi envisions the ideal battle to be like this: quick to strike and quick to end.

When we think of war, we might think of two armies coming straight at each other on the battlefield, each soldier clearly identified by uniform as a member of one army or the other. Unless one of those armies far outnumbered and outgunned the other, it's hard to think how Sunzi would approve of it as the primary method of warfare. This kind of head-on melee is called frontal warfare. The method of the hawk, on the other hand, is the surprise attack.

According to Sunzi, using frontal and surprise attacks to catch the enemy off guard and create a decisive victory is the most desirable way to battle. It is like the cycles mentioned above and like the constantly changing positions in the Eight Trigrams formation. Using frontal and surprise methods in unpredictable combinations keeps the enemy on their heels, allowing for a decisive strike.

There are many times when Sunzi discusses knowing who will win and who will lose. At first glance, this kind of comment probably seems pretty forgettable, but there is a bigger idea behind it. Going all the way back to the *Yijing*, which began to take shape about five hundred years before Sunzi is said to have lived, we see a great concern in the early Chinese to understand the cycles of nature. To understand a cycle is to be able to make predictions, and therefore to be able to act at the right time to your advantage. The *Yijing* is less about fortune-telling and more about interpreting cycles in order to react

appropriately. Recognizing patterns in order to react to them became a common theme in many strands of Chinese thought.

So when Sunzi says that one can gain knowledge about a battle, he is saying that by following his methods, one can see a few chess moves ahead and be in a position to strike at the opportune moment. We get a vivid sense of recognizing patterns when he discusses how to interpret dust kicked up by the advancing enemy (Chapter 9).

In a book about warfare, we shouldn't be surprised to see talk of killing the enemy, but we also see in Sunzi some pretty harsh methods used on his own soldiers, like putting them in a desperate situation so that they fight to the death. And in the story about Sunzi training the palace women, his method of discipline is, from a contemporary perspective, downright inhumane. This aspect of Sunzi's philosophy represents a line of thinking that gradually gained acceptance during the later pre-imperial period: rigorous discipline, harsh punishment, and generous rewards, meted out in ways that were easy to understand and consistently applied. The idea was to take advantage of basic human motivations around pleasure and fear. This led to well-organized and well-motivated troops.

This disciplinarian and legalistic approach contrasted sharply with the moralistic approach of the Confucians, who favored intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation. In Sunzi's defense, he was not proposing an organizational philosophy for all of society, just for the very specific case of the military—conditions of *wu*. And although he left the *wen* to the noblemen and civil servants, he is very clear that the end goal for *wu* is a peaceful, prosperous state. That's why he is so strongly against rushing into war. Not only should your goals in warfare be clear, they must be clearly achievable. In the end, we see that although Sunzi's methods are harsh, he is a humanitarian underneath—*wu* for the sake of *wen*.

III. THE ARTIST AND HIS WORK

When I was a kid and the daily newspaper was still a thing, I loved reading the comic strips and the political cartoons. They could be cute, amusing, and insightful all at once. When I came

across C. C. Tsai's illustrated versions of the Chinese classics, I recognized the same brilliant combination of wit and wisdom and fell in love with his books.

I would be remiss if I finished this introduction without introducing the inimitable Chih-chung Tsai (蔡志忠), who goes by "C. C." in English, and whose own story is as amazing as anything he depicts in his books. The way he tells it, he knew at the age of five that he would draw for a living, and at the age of fifteen, his father gave him permission to drop out of school and move from their small town to the metropolis of Taipei, where a comic publisher had welcomed him after receiving an unsolicited manuscript, not realizing how young he was. The young C. C. developed his own humorous comic book characters, all the while honing his skills and learning from other illustrators. During a required three-year stint in the military, he devoted all of his free time to educating himself in art history and graphic design. On leaving the military he tested into a major movie and television production company, beating out other applicants with their formal educations. There, he had the good fortune of coming across a cache of Disney films and taught himself animation. Soon he was making his own short films, and then decided to open his own animation studio, winning Taiwan's equivalent of the Oscar just two years later.

Always looking for a new challenge, C. C. began a syndicated comic strip, which quickly expanded to five different strips in magazines and newspapers across Southeast Asia. At the height of his popularity as a syndicated cartoonist, he turned in yet another direction—the illustration of the Chinese classics in comic book format. They were an instant success and propelled him to the top of the bestseller list. That's what you have in your hand.

According to C. C., the secret to his success is not ambition, or even hard work. It's just about having fun and following his interests. One of his interests has been studying the classics. Remember, he dropped out of middle school. By ordinary standards, he should be unable to grasp the language of ancient China. The early Chinese wrote in a language that is to contemporary Chinese as Latin is to contemporary Spanish or Italian. But he is a tireless autodidact, with a nearly photographic memory. He knows as much about the Chinese classics as

many Ph.D.s in the field. The main difference between him and a tenured professor is that he isn't interested in the refined disputes and distinctions on which scholars spend their careers. He merely wants to understand the ideas and share them with others. This book, and others in the series, is the result of playtime in his modest studio—serious and lighthearted, whimsical and profound all at once.

In working with the classics, C. C. stays close to tradition, and in his illustrations he more or less follows the prominent commentaries. This means that the texts that underpin his books are pretty much the same as the texts that underpin other translations you will find on bookstore shelves, with incidental differences here and there that are insignificant to the overall meaning.

C. C. translated the Classical language into contemporary Chinese so that the average reader could understand it. While

respecting his interpretive choices where there is ambiguity, I've also chosen to translate with an eye to the Classical language, rather than just from his contemporary Chinese. This helps avoid the attenuation of meaning that happens when communication goes through too many steps—like in the “telephone” game that children play.

In this book, there are just a few places where some explanatory content has been added.

The reader should have full confidence that each classic illustrated by C. C. is the real deal. The advantage that these versions of the classics have over regular, text-only editions is the visual dimension that brings the reader directly into the world of the ancients.

I hope that you enjoy this English version of C. C.'s illustrated *Art of War* as much as so many others have enjoyed the original Chinese version.

Sunzi's Art of War



孫子武者，齊人也。以兵法見於吳王闔廬。闔廬曰：「子之十三篇，吾盡觀之矣，可以小試勒兵乎？」對曰：


THE LIFE OF SUN WU



IT IS SAID THAT AROUND 500 BCE, DURING THE SPRING & AUTUMN PERIOD IN CHINA, THERE LIVED A MAN WITH THE SURNAME SUN AND GIVEN NAME WU. OUT OF RESPECT FOR HIS GREATNESS, THE SUFFIX ZI IS ADDED TO HIS SURNAME, JUST LIKE IN KONGZI (CONFUCIUS), MENGZI (MENCIUS), AND ZHUANGZI. HE IS SAID TO HAVE LIVED IN THE STATE OF QI AND IS CREDITED WITH HAVING WRITTEN THE THIRTEEN CHAPTERS OF *SUNZI BINGFA*, OR *SUNZI'S PRINCIPLES AND TACTICS OF WARFARE*.




HE ONCE PRESENTED THIS BOOK TO KING HELU OF WU.






FANTASTIC!
THIS IS
WONDERFUL!



I HAVE READ YOUR BOOK, SIR,
AND I AM WONDERING IF YOU
COULD USE IT TO TRAIN
A CONTINGENT
HERE AND NOW.





「可。」闔廬曰：「可試以婦人乎？」曰：「可。」於是許之，出宮中美女，得百八十人。孫子分為二隊，以王之寵姬二人各為隊長，皆令持戟。令之曰：「汝知而心與左右手背乎？」婦人曰：「知之。」


孫子曰：「前，則視心；左，視左手；右，視右手；後，即視背。」婦人曰：「諾。」約束既布，乃設鈇鉞，即三令五申之。





於是鼓之右，婦人大笑。孫子曰：「約束不明，申令不熟，將之罪也。」復三令五申而鼓之左，


婦人復大笑。孫子曰：「約束不明，申令不熟，將之罪也；既已明而不如法者，吏士之罪也。」乃欲斬左右隊長。吳王從臺上觀，見且斬愛姬，大駭。趣使使下令曰：「寡人已知將軍能用兵矣。寡人非此二姬，食不甘味，






願勿斬也。」孫子曰：「臣既已受命為將，將在軍，君命有所不受。」遂斬隊長二人以徇。

用其次為隊長，於是復鼓之。婦人左右前後跪起皆中規矩繩墨，無敢出聲。於是孫子使使報王曰：「兵既整齊，王可試下觀之，唯王所欲用之，雖赴水火猶可也。」吳王曰：「將軍罷休就舍，寡人不願下觀。」






孫子曰：「王徒好其言，不能用其實。」於是闔廬知孫子能用兵，卒以為將。西破彊楚，入郢，北威齊晉，顯名諸侯，孫子與有力焉。

【史記·孫子吳起列傳】

CHAPTER 1


Calculation




CALCULATION



WARFARE IS A VITAL AFFAIR
OF THE STATE, INVOLVING
THE LIFE AND DEATH
OF PEOPLE ...



AND THE SURVIVAL OR DESTRUCTION
OF THE STATE.





THEREFORE, IT MUST BE
CAREFULLY EXAMINED AND
CONSIDERED WITH CAUTION.



孫子曰：兵者，國之大事，死生之地，存亡之道，不可不察也。


故經之以五事，校之以計而索其情：一曰道，二曰天，三曰地，四曰將，五曰法。






道者，令民與上同意也，故可以與之死，可以與之生，而不畏危；


天者，陰陽、寒暑、時制也。







地者，遠近、險易、廣狹、死生也。

將者，智、信、仁、勇、嚴也。



WISDOM, TRUSTWORTHINESS, BENEVOLENCE, COURAGE





法者，
曲制、
官道、
主用也。

法令孰行？
 凡此五者，將莫不聞；知之者勝，不知者不勝。故校之以計而索其情，曰：主孰有道？將孰有能？天地孰得？


THE SEVEN CALCULATIONS



WE MUST LOOK AT WARFARE
 FROM THESE FIVE POINTS OF VIEW
 —COMPARING, CALCULATING,
 AND SEEKING THE FACTS.
 THEN WE MUST
 ASK OURSELVES ...



WHOSE GOVERNMENT IS ABLE TO
 ESTABLISH A MORAL CAUSE AND GAIN
 THE PEOPLE'S ENTHUSIASTIC
 COOPERATION?



WHOSE GENERALS ARE MOST CAPABLE?




WHO CAN TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
 THE MANY FACETS OF HEAVEN
 AND EARTH?




WHOSE ORDERS WILL BE CARRIED
 OUT MOST SUCCESSFULLY?



WHOSE ARMY IS STRONGEST?




WHOSE TROOPS HAVE THE
BEST TRAINING?



WHICH ARMY'S REWARDS AND
PUNISHMENTS ARE FAIREST AND
STRICTEST?




FROM THESE COMPARISONS,
WE CAN PREDICT WHO WILL BE
THE VICTOR AND WHO
THE VANQUISHED.



兵眾孰強？士卒孰練？賞罰孰明？吾以此知勝負矣。

兵者，詭道也。故能而示之不能，用而示之不用，近而示之遠，遠而示之近。




**TAKING
ADVANTAGE
OF THE
ENEMY**



LURE THE ENEMY WITH A SMALL ADVANTAGE;
SOW DISORDER AMONG THE RANKS OF THE ENEMY,
AND ATTACK WHEN CHAOS ERUPTS;
WHEN THE ENEMY EXHIBITS NO WEAK POINTS, FULLY READY YOUR OWN SIDE;
WHEN THE ENEMY IS STRONG, AVOID HIM; TAUNT THE ENEMY INTO ANGER;
FEIGN WEAKNESS TO CREATE OVERCONFIDENCE IN THE ENEMY;
WHEN THE ENEMY NEEDS REST, KEEP HIM ACTIVE;
WHEN THE ENEMY IS UNIFIED, SEEK TO SPLINTER HIM.



ATTACK WHEN HE IS UNPREPARED,
AND TAKE HIM BY SURPRISE.
THESE ARE THE WAYS TO MILITARY
VICTORY, AND NONE SHOULD
BE LEAKED.




利而誘之，亂而取之，實而備之，強而避之，怒而撓之，卑而驕之，佚而勞之，親而離之，攻其無備，出其不意。
此兵家之勝，不可先傳也。

此觀之，勝負見矣。
夫未戰而廟算勝者，得算多也；未戰而廟算不勝者，得算少也。多算勝，少算不勝，而況於無算乎！吾以

CALCULATING VICTORY




BEFORE A WAR BEGINS,
FIRST GO TO THE PALACE AND
CALCULATE THE STRENGTHS
AND WEAKNESSES
OF EACH SIDE.



THE VICTOR WILL BE THE ONE
WITH MORE STRENGTHS.



THE VANQUISHED
WILL BE THE ONE
WITH FEWER
STRENGTHS.



WITH CORRECT CALCULATIONS,
A WAR CAN BE WON. YOU CANNOT
WIN WITH INCORRECT CALCULATIONS,
LET ALONE NO CALCULATIONS AT ALL.



IF EXAMINED IN THIS WAY,
WE CAN PREDICT THE VICTOR
AND THE VANQUISHED.



CHAPTER 2

Waging War



孫子曰：凡用兵之法，馳車千駟，革車千乘，帶甲十萬，千里饋糧，則內外之費，賓客之用，膠漆之材，車甲之奉，日費千金，然後十萬之師舉矣。

A
MILLION
DOLLARS
A DAY



SUNZI SAID: WHEN SENDING THE
MILITARY INTO THE FIELD, YOU WILL
NEED A THOUSAND CHARIOTS AND A
THOUSAND SUPPLY WAGONS.



THESE WILL ACCOMPANY A HUNDRED THOUSAND
ARMORED SOLDIERS, AND FOOD WILL HAVE TO BE
TRANSPORTED HUNDREDS OF MILES ...



ADD ON THE EXPENDITURES FOR DIPLOMACY,
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, SUPPLEMENTAL
PROVISIONS, AND MAINTENANCE OF
EQUIPMENT, AND THE TOTAL WILL BE
A GREAT SUM OF MONEY EVERY DAY.



ONLY WHEN ALL THESE ARE PREPARED CAN A
CONTINGENT OF A HUNDRED THOUSAND
SOLDIERS SET OUT.



PROTRACTED
WAR IS
DISADVANTAGEOUS




WHEN AN ARMY GOES OFF TO WAR,
VICTORY SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY GOAL.



ONCE THE WAR DRAGS ON, THE TROOPS
BECOME TIRED, AND THEIR MORALE SUFFERS.
WHEN IT COMES TIME TO ATTACK, THEIR
STRENGTH IS QUICKLY EXHAUSTED.




A PROTRACTED WAR WILL ALSO DEplete
THE FUNDS OF THE STATE.



HURRY BACK
TO HELP OUT
AT HOME!





I CAN'T
GET AWAY
RIGHT NOW!



THIS IS WHEN NEIGHBORING STATES WILL
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION AND
INVADE, AND EVEN THE CLEVEREST OF
LEADERS WILL BE AT A LOSS.

其用戰也勝，久則鈍兵挫銳，攻城則力屈，久暴師則國用不足。夫鈍兵挫銳，屈力殫貨，則諸侯乘其弊而起，雖有智者，不能善其後矣。

故兵聞拙速，未睹巧之久也。夫兵久而國利者，未之有也。



**THE LONGER THE WAR,
THE MORE AND GREATER DAMAGE IS DONE;
AND EVEN IF YOU WIN, THE GAINS WILL NOT MAKE UP
FOR THE LOSSES. AIM FOR VICTORY, NOT DURATION. BY
QUICKLY DEFEATING THE ENEMY AND RESOLVING THE
CONFLICT, YOU WILL AVOID TIRING AND ANGERING
THE PEOPLE AND MIRING YOUR COUNTRY IN WAR,
WHICH WOULD SURELY LEAD TO A
COLLAPSE OF THE ECONOMY.**


**GAIN
STRENGTH
THROUGH
THE
ENEMY**



IF YOU DO NOT UNDERSTAND
THE HARM THAT MILITARY
ACTIONS CAUSE, THEN YOU CANNOT
UNDERSTAND THE BENEFITS
GAINED THROUGH
MILITARY ACTION.



AFTER ONE DRAFT, AN ABLE MILITARY COMMANDER
WILL NOT IMPLEMENT A SECOND LEVY.




IF WE DON'T
HAVE ENOUGH
GRAIN ON OUR
OWN SIDE, WE'LL
GET IT FROM
THE ENEMY.




WHAT
IF WE
RUN
OUT?


HE WILL
ALSO NEVER
CREATE THE
NEED TO SHIP
GRAIN MORE
THAN TWICE.



故不盡知用兵之害者，則不能盡知用兵之利也。
善用兵者，役不再籍，糧不三載；取用於國，因糧於敵，故軍食可足也。

故智將務食於敵，食敵一鍾，當吾二十鍾；芻秆一石，當吾二十石。
 故殺敵者，怒也；取敵之利者，貨也。故車戰得車十乘已上，賞其先得者，





而更其旌旗。車雜而乘之，卒善而養之，是謂勝敵而益強。


故兵貴勝，不貴久。
故知兵之將，生民之司命，國家安危之主也。

THE
GENERAL
WHO
KNOWS




QUICK TO
FIGHT, QUICK
TO END IT!

MILITARY ACTIONS
SHOULD TAKE VICTORY
AS THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVE
AND SHOULD NEVER BE
ALLOWED TO DRAG ON.



A GENERAL WHO UNDERSTANDS HOW TO FIGHT A WAR KNOWS THAT
HE HOLDS THE SURVIVAL OF THE PEOPLE IN HIS HANDS AND IS THE
PROTECTOR OF THE COUNTRY'S PEACE.



AN ABLE
MILITARY
COMMANDER
STRENGTHENS HIS
FORCES, MAKES THE
ENEMY'S STRENGTHS
HIS OWN, HAS A
PROFOUND
UNDERSTANDING OF
THE DANGERS OF
PROTRACTED WAR,
AND AIMS AT ENDING
A MILITARY ACTION
AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.
THEREFORE, THE
GENERAL WHO
UNDERSTANDS
WARFARE IS THE KEY
TO PEACE
IN A COUNTRY!



CHAPTER 3

Offensive Strategy



孫子曰：凡用兵之法，全國為上，破國次之；全軍為上，破軍次之；全旅為上，破旅次之；全卒為上，破卒次之；全伍為上，破伍次之。


**SENDING
TROOPS
INTO THE
FIELD**




WHEN SENDING SOLDIERS
OUT INTO THE FIELD, KEEPING THE
COUNTRY WHOLE IS BETTER THAN
BRINGING HARM TO IT, EVEN IF
VICTORY WERE
TO BE GAINED.




KEEPING THE ARMY WHOLE IS BETTER THAN BRINGING
HARM TO IT. THE SAME GOES FOR THE BATTALION,
THE COMPANY, RIGHT DOWN TO THE SQUAD.



THEREFORE, FIGHTING AND WINNING A HUNDRED WARS IS NOT THE GREATEST GOOD.



THE GREATEST GOOD IS GETTING THE ENEMY TO SURRENDER WITHOUT EVER HAVING TO FIGHT.



KILL!

HA, HA ...
I WON WITHOUT
FIGHTING!


是故百戰百勝，非善之善者也；不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者也。

故上兵伐謀，其次伐交，其次伐兵，

MULTIPLE FRONTS



THE BEST PLAN IN WAR IS TO ATTACK THROUGH THE USE OF CUNNING STRATEGY.



USE YOUR BRAIN TO BEAT THE ENEMY!







?

THE NEXT BEST PLAN IS TO ATTACK THE ENEMY THROUGH ALLIANCES, FORCING THE ENEMY TO CAPITULATE.




I GIVE UP!

AFTER THAT, THE BEST STRATEGY IS TO ATTACK THE ENEMY USING A STRONG ARMY, THEREBY FORCING HIM TO SURRENDER.




其下攻城。攻城之法，為不得已。修櫓轆輶，具器械，三月而後成；距闐，又三月而後已。

將不勝其忿而蟻附之，殺士三分之一，而城不拔者，此攻之災也。




IF A GENERAL FEELS THAT THIS IS TOO SLOW, AND IS UNABLE TO CONTROL HIS FURY, HE WILL ORDER THE SOLDIERS TO ATTACK LIKE SO MANY ANTS.

ONE THIRD OF THEM WILL DIE ...




AND THE WALL WILL REMAIN STANDING. THIS IS THE SAD CALAMITY OF BESIEGING CITIES.


SO A COMMANDER WHO
EXCELS AT PUTTING SOLDIERS
IN THE FIELD CAN GET THE
ENEMY TO SURRENDER
WITHOUT FIGHTING;



CAN CAPTURE THE ENEMY'S CITY
WITHOUT LAYING SIEGE TO IT;







AND HE CAN DESTROY THE ENEMY COUNTRY WITHOUT
ENGAGING IN A PROTRACTED WAR.



故善用兵者，屈人之兵而非戰也，拔人之城而非攻也，毀人之國而非久也。

必以全爭於天下，故兵不頓而利可全，此謀攻之法也。





故用兵之法，十則圍之，五則攻之，倍則分之，

敵則能戰之，少則能逃之，不若則能避之。

IF YOUR NUMBERS ARE EQUAL
WITH THE ENEMY'S ...



BE ABLE TO FIGHT
IF NECESSARY.

FIRST, FIND THE
ENEMY'S WEAK POINTS,
THEN ATTACK THEM.



COME OUT HERE AND
FIGHT LIKE A REAL ARMY
SO WE CAN FINISH THIS
ONCE AND FOR ALL!

IF YOUR NUMBERS ARE SMALLER THAN
THE ENEMY'S, BE ABLE TO RETREAT.




IF
YOU'RE
SO TOUGH,
COME IN
HERE!



IF YOUR FORCES ARE FAR
INFERIOR TO THE ENEMY'S,
BE ABLE TO EVADE HIM.

GET BACK HERE
AND FIGHT!




I HAVE TO USE MY
HIT AND RUN
GUERRILLA TACTICS.
I CAN'T FIGHT YOU
HEAD ON.



SOLDIERS OF A WEAK ARMY WHO
STUBBORNLY FIGHT ON ...



ALL RIGHT,
LET'S GET IT
OVER WITH
RIGHT NOW!



END UP THE
STRONGER ARMY'S
PRISONERS.

I
GIVE
UP!

WHEN YOUR
FORCES ARE STRONGER
THAN THE ENEMY'S,
SURROUND HIM, ATTACK HIM,
AND DIVIDE HIM. WHEN YOUR
FORCES DON'T MEASURE UP
TO THE ENEMY'S, BE ABLE
TO FIGHT, BE ABLE TO HOLD
YOUR GROUND, AND BE ABLE
TO EVADE HIM. IN ADDITION,
EXCEPTIONAL LEADERSHIP IS
NEEDED TO ATTAIN THE GOALS
OF FIGHTING, HOLDING
GROUND, AND EVADING
THE ENEMY. OTHERWISE,
THERE WILL BE THE
DANGER OF SUFFERING
AN AGONIZING
DEFEAT.



故小敵之堅，大敵之擒也。

夫將者，國之輔也；輔周則國必強，輔隙則國必弱。


**POWERS
OF THE
COMMANDER**



THE GENERAL IS THE PILLAR OF A COUNTRY.



IF THE GENERAL'S CHARACTER AND ABILITIES ARE
WITHOUT REPROACH, THE COUNTRY
WILL BE STRONG ...



IF THEY ARE LACKING, THE COUNTRY
WILL BE WEAK.




故君之所以患於軍者三：不知軍之不可以進而謂之進，不知軍之不可以退而謂之退，是謂糜軍。不知三軍之事，而同三軍之政，則軍士惑矣；不知三軍之權，而同三軍之任，則軍士疑矣。


THERE ARE THREE
WAYS A SOVEREIGN CAN
HARM THE ARMY ...




ONE: HE CAN IGNORANTLY ORDER THE ARMY
TO ADVANCE WHEN THEY SHOULDN'T OR
RETREAT WHEN THEY SHOULDN'T.
THIS IS CALLED TYING UP THE ARMY.



TWO: HE CAN IGNORANTLY INTERFERE
WITH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION, THUS
CONFUSING THE OFFICERS AND MEN SO
THAT THEY AREN'T SURE WHAT TO DO.



THREE: HE CAN IGNORANTLY TAKE ON THE DUTIES
OF A GENERAL, THUS SOWING DOUBT AMONG THE
OFFICERS AND MEN.




WHO ARE
WE SUPPOSED
TO LISTEN
TO?

I DON'T
KNOW
EITHER ...



三軍既惑且疑，則諸侯之難至矣。是謂亂軍引勝。
 故知勝有五：知可以戰與不可以戰者勝，識眾寡之用者勝，上下同欲者勝，以虞待不虞者勝，將能而君不
 御者勝。此五者，知勝之道也。





故曰：知彼知己者，百戰不殆；不知彼而知己，一勝一負；

不知彼，不知己，每戰必殆。



CHAPTER 4

Tactical Disposition



孫子曰：昔之善戰者，先為不可勝，以待敵之可勝；不可勝在己，可勝在敵。故善戰者，能為不可勝，不能使敵之可勝。

**CONDITIONS
FOR
ATTACK
AND
DEFENSE**



HISTORICALLY, THOSE WHO EXCELLED AT WAGING WAR WOULD FIRST MAKE THEIR SIDE INVINCIBLE AND THEN WAIT FOR A PRIME OPPORTUNITY TO ATTACK THE ENEMY.



WHETHER OR NOT MY ARMY CAN BE DEFEATED DEPENDS ON ME.




WHETHER OR NOT THE ENEMY MAKES A MISTAKE THAT WOULD ALLOW ME THE OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN VICTORY DEPENDS ON HIM.




SO WE SEE, SOMEONE WHO EXCELS AT WAGING WAR CAN PROTECT HIS OWN SIDE FROM GIVING THE ENEMY AN OPPORTUNITY FOR VICTORY, BUT HE CANNOT NECESSARILY MAKE THE ENEMY SUSCEPTIBLE TO DEFEAT.




THAT'S WHY IT IS SAID:
VICTORY CAN BE KNOWN BUT NOT MADE.
VICTORY CAN BE PREDICTED, BUT THE MOMENT CANNOT BE FORCED.



WHEN WE CANNOT DEFEAT THE
ENEMY, WE SHOULD TAKE UP A
DEFENSIVE POSITION.



WHEN WE CAN DEFEAT THE
ENEMY, WE SHOULD ENGAGE
IN BATTLE.




故曰：勝可知，而不可為。不可勝者，守也，可勝者，攻也。


守則不足，攻則有餘。善守者藏於九地之下，善攻者動於九天之上，故能自保而全勝也。




ONE TAKES UP A DEFENSIVE POSITION BECAUSE ONE LACKS THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR VICTORY.



ONE ENGAGES IN BATTLE BECAUSE ONE HAS MORE THAN ENOUGH STRENGTH.



AN ARMY THAT IS ADEPT AT DEFENDING DOES NOT LET THE ENEMY GAIN EVEN THE SMALLEST INSIGHT AS TO ITS ACTUAL SITUATION, AS IF IT WERE HIDDEN UNDERGROUND.



AN ARMY ADEPT AT ATTACKING STRIKES AS IF IT WERE DESCENDING FROM THE HEAVENS, NOT GIVING THE ENEMY AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND.




A GENERAL WHO CAN DO THIS CAN DEFEND WITHOUT WORRY OVER LOSS AND CAN ATTACK WITH THE ASSURANCE OF COMPLETE VICTORY.

**SEEK
VICTORY
BEFORE
FIGHTING**



THE ABLE MILITARY COMMANDER FIRST STANDS
ON A FOUNDATION OF INVINCIBILITY, NOT
GIVING THE ENEMY A SINGLE OPPORTUNITY
TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF,




AND HE DOESN'T MISS HIS CHANCE TO
DEFEAT THE ENEMY.



SO WE SEE, THE VICTORIOUS FIRST CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR
CERTAIN VICTORY AND ONLY THEN DO BATTLE WITH THE ENEMY.





NOW THAT WE
ARE ASSURED VICTORY,
STRIKE AND DEFEAT
THE ENEMY.



故善戰者，立於不敗之地，而不失敵之敗也。是故勝兵先勝而後求戰，

敗兵先戰而後求勝。
 故善戰者之勝也，無智名，無勇功，故其戰勝不忒。不忒者，其所措必勝，勝已敗者也。





AS FOR THE PRINCIPLES AND TACTICS OF WARFARE, THEY ARE:
I: MEASUREMENT—JUDGING THE BATTLEFIELD AND BATTLE LINES.
II: APPRAISAL—ESTIMATING THE NECESSARY FORCE.

III: CALCULATION—CALCULATING THE AMOUNT OF TROOPS AND MATERIALS.

IV: DELIBERATION—WEIGHING THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE TWO SIDES.

V: VICTORY.



THE TERRAIN DICTATES THE MEASUREMENT.
THE MEASUREMENT DICTATES THE APPRAISAL.
THE APPRAISAL DICTATES THE CALCULATION.
THE CALCULATION DICTATES THE DELIBERATION.


AND THE DELIBERATION DICTATES THE POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY.




善用兵者，修道而保法，故能為勝敗之政。
兵法：一曰度，二曰量，三曰數，四曰稱，五曰勝。地生度，度生量，量生數，數生稱，稱生勝。

故勝兵若以鎰稱銖，敗兵若以銖稱鎰。
勝者之戰民也，若決積水於千仞之谿者，形也。

THE EVENTUAL VICTOR CONCENTRATES ALL OF HIS TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE ADVANTAGES ON THE PLACE OF DECISIVE BATTLE AND IS LIKE A TON OF FORCE CRASHING INTO A POUND. THE DEFEATED IS LIKE A POUND OF FORCE TRYING TO WITHSTAND A TON.




TACTICAL DISPOSITION IS AN OVERPOWERING ARMY COMING AT ENEMY SOLDIERS LIKE DAMMED UP WATER SUDDENLY RUSHING DOWN A THOUSAND-FOOT-HIGH CHASM.



CHAPTER 5

Force



孫子曰：凡治眾如治寡，分數是也；鬪眾如鬪寡，形名是也；三軍之眾，可使必受敵而無敗者，奇正是也；兵之所加，如以瑕投卵者，虛實是也。

**FRONTAL
AND
SURPRISE**



MANAGING AN ARMY WITH A LARGE CONTINGENT OF MEN IS THE SAME AS MANAGING AN ARMY WITH A SMALL CONTINGENT. IT IS A MATTER OF ORGANIZATION.




COMMANDING A LARGE ARMY IN BATTLE IS THE SAME AS COMMANDING A SMALL ONE. IT IS A MATTER OF FORMATIONS AND SIGNALS.




A LARGE ARMY MUST BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND AN ENEMY ATTACK WITHOUT COLLAPSING. THIS IS A MATTER OF THE EFFECTIVE USE OF FRONTAL AND SURPRISE CONFRONTATIONS.



YOU SHOULD ATTACK THE ENEMY LIKE A STONE SMASHING INTO AN EGG. THIS IS A MATTER OF TAKING ADVANTAGE OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES.



IN BATTLE, USE FRONTAL ATTACKS TO
ENGAGE THE ENEMY,



INTER-
CHANGING
FRONTAL
AND
SURPRISE
ATTACKS




THEN, DEPENDING ON
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES,
USE SURPRISE ATTACKS TO
TAKE VICTORY.



LIKE RIVERS AND STREAMS—
FLOWING ENDLESSLY,

THE
EFFECTIVE
USE OF SURPRISE
ATTACKS IS LIKE
HEAVEN AND
EARTH—
INFINITE IN
TRANSFORMATIONS,




凡戰者，以正合，以奇勝。故善出奇者，無窮如天地，不竭如江河。

終而復始，日月是也；死而復生，四時是也。聲不過五，五聲之變，不可勝聽也；

LIKE THE CYCLES OF THE SUN AND MOON—ENDING AND BEGINNING AGAIN,




LIKE THE FOUR SEASONS—PASSING AWAY AND COMING TO LIFE AGAIN.



THERE ARE ONLY FIVE MUSICAL NOTES, YET ONE COULD NEVER HEAR ALL OF THEIR POSSIBLE MELODIES ...





FRONTAL AND SURPRISE CONFRONTATIONS ARE THE ONLY TWO KINDS OF FORCE FOR WAGING WAR, YET THEIR POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS ARE LIMITLESS. THEIR MUTUAL TRANSFORMATION IS LIKE TRACING THE LINE OF A CIRCLE—THERE IS NO ENDPOINT.



色不過五，五色之變，不可勝觀也；味不過五，五味之變，不可勝嘗也；戰勢不過奇正，奇正之變，不可勝窮也。奇正相生，如循環之無端，孰能窮之？

節如發機。


激水之疾，至於漂石者，勢也；鷲鳥之疾，至於毀折者，節也。是故善戰者，其勢險，其節短；勢如彍弩，




RUSHING WATER CAN MOVE ROCKS. THIS IS DUE TO ITS SPEED AND FEROCIOUS FORCE.



HAWKS DESCENDING IN ATTACK CAN SEIZE FAST-MOVING TARGETS. THIS IS DUE TO THEIR ACCURATE TIMING.



THE COMMANDER WHO EXCELS AT WAGING WAR USES FEROCIOUS FORCE, LIKE A DRAWN BOW,



AND PERFECT TIMING, LIKE THE SUDDEN RELEASE OF A CROSSBOW TRIGGER, NEVER GIVING THE ENEMY A CHANCE TO REACT.

故善戰者，求之於勢，不責於人，故能擇人而任勢。任勢者，其戰人也，如轉木石。木石之性：安則靜，危則動，方則止，圓則行。

CREATING
FORCE



A COMMANDER WHO EXCELS
AT WAGING WAR SEEKS
VICTORY THROUGH FORCE
BUT DOES NOT DEMAND IT
FROM HIS MEN ALONE.

BECAUSE OF THIS, HE CAN EXPLOIT THE FORCE OF
CIRCUMSTANCE RATHER THAN EXPLOITING HIS MEN.



ONE WHO EXPLOITS THE FORCE
OF CIRCUMSTANCE USES HIS
MEN AS IF ROLLING LOGS OR
STONES DOWN A HILL.
IT IS THE NATURE OF LOGS
AND STONES THAT ON LEVEL
GROUND THEY REMAIN STILL,



AND ON A SLOPE, THEY MOVE.




故善戰人之勢，如轉圓石於千仞之山者，勢也。



CHAPTER 6

Strength and Weakness



孫子曰：凡先處戰地而待敵者佚，後處戰地而趨戰者勞。故善戰者，致人而不致於人。

CONTROL OTHERS INSTEAD OF BEING CONTROLLED



WHOEVER ARRIVES AT THE BATTLEFIELD FIRST
WILL BE AT EASE AND IN A POSITION TO TAKE
THE INITIATIVE.





THE LATECOMER WILL HAVE TO RUSH TO MEET THE ENEMY
ON THE BATTLEFIELD AND THUS WILL BE TIRED AND AT A
DISADVANTAGE.



THUS, THE COMMANDER WHO EXCELS
AT WAGING WAR CONTROLS THE ENEMY
INSTEAD OF BEING CONTROLLED BY
THE ENEMY.

COME ON!
COME ON!









能使敵人自至者，利之也；能使敵人不得至者，害之也。故敵佚能勞之，飽能饑之，安能動之。


故形人而我無形，則我專而敵分；我專為一，敵分為十，是以十攻其一也；則我眾而敵寡，能以眾擊寡者，則吾之所與戰者約矣。吾所與戰之地不可知，不可知，則敵所備者多；敵所備者多，則吾所與戰者寡矣。

CONCENTRATION AGAINST FRAGMENTATION



BY OUTNUMBERING THE ENEMY, YOU RENDER HIM WEAK AND EASY TO CONTROL.







夫兵形象水，水之形避高而趨下，兵之形避實而擊虛。水因地而制流，兵因敵而制勝。




故兵無常勢，水無常形，能因敵變化而取勝者謂之神。
故五行無常勝，

IN WARFARE, THERE IS NO
SINGLE WAY TO CREATE FORCE,
NO ENDURING DISPOSITION.
BEING ABLE TO GAIN VICTORY
BY ADAPTING TO THE ENEMY'S
CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
IS LIKE HAVING
SUPERNATURAL
POWERS.



DEPLOYING FORCES IS LIKE THE
TRANSFORMATIONS AMONG THE
FIVE ELEMENTS—METAL, WOOD,
WATER, FIRE, AND EARTH—
ALTERNATELY ARISING AND
GIVING WAY, NOT CONCERNED
WITH WHICH ONE IS AT A
TEMPORARY ADVANTAGE.





WHEN IT COMES TO DEPLOYING FORCES, THERE ARE NO ABSOLUTE PRECEPTS. JUST AS WATER HAS NO PARTICULAR SHAPE, THERE IS NO SET DISPOSITION FOR TROOP DEPLOYMENT. AVOID ENEMY STRENGTHS AND STRIKE AT WEAKNESSES. ALTERNATE YOUR TACTICS FROM SURPRISE TO FRONTAL CONFRONTATIONS AND BACK, ACCORDING TO CIRCUMSTANCES.



四時無常位，日有短長，月有死生。

CHAPTER 7


Maneuver



MAKE
THE
CROOKED
STRAIGHT




THE MOST DIFFICULT THING ABOUT BATTLE IS
MANEUVERING YOUR FORCES TO THE BEST
ADVANTAGE ...



TURNING A SETBACK INTO A GAIN.



TURNING A
LONG ROAD INTO A
SHORT ONE ...



MANEUVERING TROOPS
CAN BRING ADVANTAGES,
BUT IT CAN ALSO
BE PERILOUS.



HEE, HEE,
HEE ...




孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚眾，交和而舍，莫難於軍爭。軍爭之難者，以迂為直，以患為利。故迂其途而誘之以利，後人發，先人至，此知迂直之計者也。

故軍爭為利，軍爭為危。舉軍而爭利則不及，委軍而爭利則輜重損。是故卷甲而趨，日夜不處，倍道兼行，百里而爭利，則擒三將軍，


ADVANTAGE AND DISADVANTAGE



IF THE ENTIRE ARMY SETS OUT TOGETHER, WITH
MEN, HORSES, AND CARTS, THE GOING WILL
SURELY BE SLOW.





AND ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE SWIFTER IF THE CARTS
AND EQUIPMENT WERE LEFT BEHIND, THEY COULD
EASILY BE CAPTURED BY THE ENEMY.




HA, HA, HA.
NOW THAT WE
HAVE THE
ENEMY'S
SUPPLIES, WE'LL
WIN FOR
SURE.


FURTHERMORE, IF YOU ATTEMPT TO MAKE
UP TIME BY MARCHING ALL DAY AND ALL
NIGHT WITH LIGHT PACKS, YOU
MAY BE ABLE TO INCREASE
YOUR DISTANCE BY
TWENTY-SOME
MILES A
DAY,




BUT THE ARMY WILL BE DISPERSED BECAUSE THE STRONGER ONES WILL GET OUT AHEAD WHILE THE EXHAUSTED ONES FALL BEHIND. IF THIS IS THE CASE, ONLY ONE TENTH OF YOUR ARMY WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE A HASTY ARRIVAL AT THE BATTLEFIELD,



AND ONCE THEY ARRIVE, THEY WILL SURELY BE DEFEATED. THERE IS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE DEFEAT, THE COMMANDERS WILL BE CAPTURED.



THEREFORE, IF IT IS NOT BACKED UP BY TRANSPORT WAGONS, THE ARMY WILL NOT SURVIVE.



AN ARMY CANNOT SURVIVE FOR LONG WITHOUT STORES OF FOOD, ARMOR, AND WEAPONS.




勁者先，疲者後，其法十一而至；五十里而爭利，則蹶上將軍，其法半至；三十里而爭利，則三分之二至。是故軍無輜重則亡，無糧食則亡，無委積則亡。

故不知諸侯之謀者，不能豫交；不知山林險阻沮澤之形者，不能行軍；不用鄉導者，不能得地利。

IF YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND THE INTENTIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS,
YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY MAKE USE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.



IF YOU DON'T UNDERSTAND THE TERRAIN OF MOUNTAINS, FORESTS,
VALLEYS, MARSHES, AND SWAMPS, YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE
TO LEAD TROOPS INTO BATTLE.




AND IF YOU DON'T USE THE
LOCALS AS GUIDES, YOU WON'T
GAIN THE ADVANTAGES THAT
THE TERRAIN HAS TO OFFER.




WIND,
FOREST,
FIRE,
MOUNTAIN



THE ARMY THAT SUCCEEDS THROUGH
CUNNING TACTICS ...



AND MOVES FOR ADVANTAGE,




TRANSFORMS ITSELF THROUGH TACTICAL PHASES
OF UNITY AND SEPARATION.



故兵以詐立，以利動，以分合為變者也。

故其疾如風，其徐如林；侵掠如火，

WIND
WHEN MOVING, BE FLEET LIKE THE WIND.




FOREST
WHEN STOPPING, BE STILL
LIKE TREES IN A FOREST.



FIRE
WHEN ATTACKING,
BE FEROCIOUS
LIKE THE SEARING
FLAMES OF A FIRE.




MOUNTAIN
WHEN DEFENDING,
BE IMMOVABLE
LIKE A MOUNTAIN.



不動如山，
難知如陰，
動如雷震。

LIGHTNING
WHEN ADVANCING,
BE SUDDEN
LIKE LIGHTNING,
ALLOWING THE
ENEMY NO CHANCE
FOR RETREAT.



CLOUDS
WHEN HIDING,
COMPLETELY DISAPPEAR,
AS THOUGH BEHIND
DARK CLOUDS.



WHEN
ENGAGING
IN WARFARE,
BASE YOUR
ACTIONS ON
THE CHANGING
CIRCUMSTANCES
OF THE ENEMY.
CONSIDER THE
CHANGES, TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF
OPPORTUNITIES,
AND GAIN VICTORY
THROUGH THE
ENEMY. IF YOU CAN
BE LIKE THESE SIX
THINGS—WIND,
FOREST, FIRE,
MOUNTAIN, CLOUDS,
AND LIGHTNING
—VICTORY
WILL BE
YOURS.



CHAPTER 8

Flexibility




FLEXIBILITY



WHEN PUTTING AN ARMY
INTO THE FIELD, THE GENERAL
RECEIVES THE ORDER FROM THE
SOVEREIGN, THE PEOPLE ARE
CONSCRIPTED, AND AN ARMY
IS FORMED ...




DO NOT BIVOUAC ON DIFFICULT GROUND.



ON PIVOTAL GROUND, ALLY WITH THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES;





**DO NOT LINGER IN TERRAIN THAT SEPARATES YOU FROM
YOUR SUPPLIES;**



孫子曰：凡用兵之法，將受命於君，合軍聚眾。圯地無舍，衢地交合，絕地無留，


圍地則謀，死地則戰。
塗有所不由，軍有所不擊，





城有所不攻，地有所不爭，君命有所不受。
 故將通於九變之利者，知用兵矣；將不通於九變之利者，雖知地形，不能得地之利矣；治兵不知九變之術，雖知五利，不能得人之用矣。


是故智者之慮，必雜於利害；雜於利而務可信也，雜於害而患可解也。
是故屈諸侯者以害，役諸侯者以業，趨諸侯者以利。



DO NOT EXPECT THE ENEMY NOT TO COME AT A CERTAIN TIME.
INSTEAD, ALWAYS BE IN COMPLETE MILITARY READINESS.



DO NOT EXPECT THE ENEMY NOT TO ATTACK AT A CERTAIN PLACE.
INSTEAD, ENSURE THAT THE ENEMY WOULD NOT BE
SUCCESSFUL IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK.



THERE ARE FIVE PERSONAL TRAITS
THAT ARE DANGEROUS
IN A COMMANDER:





INTENT ON DYING, HE CAN BE KILLED.
INTENT ON LIVING, HE CAN BE CAPTURED.
QUICK TO ANGER, HE CAN BE INSULTED.
SELF-CONSCIOUS, HE CAN BE HUMILIATED.
COMPASSIONATE, HE CAN BE TROUBLED.




故用兵之法，無恃其不來，恃吾有以待也；無恃其不攻，恃吾有所不可攻也。



故將有五危：必死可殺也，必生可虜也，




A COMMANDER WHO HAS TO WIN AT ANY COST IS
LIKELY TO BE CUT DOWN BY THE ENEMY.



A COMMANDER WHO FEARS DEATH AND
IS AFRAID IN THE FACE OF BATTLE IS LIKELY
TO BE CAPTURED BY THE ENEMY.






忿速可侮也，廉潔可辱也，愛民可煩也。
 凡此五者，將之過也，用兵之災也。覆軍殺將，必以五危，不可不察也。


CHAPTER 9

On the March




DEPLOYMENT


WHEN DEPLOYING TROOPS AND OBSERVING THE ENEMY, TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING POINTS:




WHEN TRAVERSING A MOUNTAIN RANGE, FOLLOW THE VALLEYS;



LOOK FOR PLACES SUITABLE TO ATTACK OR DEFEND, AS WELL AS HIGH PLACES SUITABLE FOR ENCAMPMENT.



IF THE ENEMY IS THE FIRST TO GAIN THE HIGH GROUND, DO NOT COMMENCE A FRONTAL ASSAULT. THESE ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF DEPLOYING TROOPS TO A MOUNTAINOUS AREA.





孫子曰：凡處軍相敵，絕山依谷，視生處高，戰隆無登，此處山之軍也。

絕水必遠水；客絕水而來，勿迎之於水內，令半濟而擊之，利；欲戰者，無附於水而迎客；

WHEN FORDING A RIVER, CROSS QUICKLY AND DISTANCE YOURSELF FROM IT, LEST THE ENEMY TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE SITUATION;




IF THE ENEMY CROSSES A RIVER IN THE COURSE OF THEIR ATTACK, DO NOT ENTER THE WATER TO ENGAGE THEM;




WAIT UNTIL THEY ARE HALF ACROSS AND HALF IN THE WATER, THEN ATTACK.




IF ANTICIPATING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE ENEMY, DO NOT ENGAGE FROM A RIVERBANK;








視生處高，無迎水流，此處水上之軍也。絕斥澤，惟亟去無留。若交軍於斥澤之中，必依水草而背眾樹，此處斥澤之軍也。


平陸處易，而右背高，前死後生，此處平陸之軍也。凡此四軍之利，黃帝之所以勝四帝也。





敵近而靜者，恃其險也；遠而挑戰者，欲人之進也；其所居易者，利也。

眾樹動者，來也；眾草多障者，疑也；鳥起者，伏也；獸駭者，覆也。塵高而銳者，車來也；卑而廣者，徒來也。




IF THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY ARE HUMBLE, YET
HE MAINTAINS HIS READINESS, THIS IS A SIGN
THAT HE WILL ATTACK.



IF THE ENEMY'S WORDS ARE FORCEFUL
AND HIS TROOPS FEIGN ADVANCES,
THIS IS A SIGN THAT HE WILL
RETREAT.



IF THE ENEMY ADVANCES WITH CHARIOTS ON
BOTH FLANKS, HE IS READY TO ENGAGE.



IF THE ENEMY OFFERS PEACE WITHOUT A TREATY,
HE IS CERTAIN TO HAVE ULTERIOR MOTIVES.

辭卑而益備者，進也；辭彊而進驅者，退也。輕車先出居其側者，陳也；無約而請和者，謀也。

CHAPTER 10

Terrain



TERRAIN

THERE ARE SIX KINDS OF
TERRAIN: ACCESSIBLE, STEEP,
DEADLOCKED, OBSTRUCTED,
PERILOUS, AND
SEPARATING.

孫子曰：地形有通者，有挂者，有支者，有隘者，有險者，有遠者。我可以往，彼可以來，曰通；通形者，先居高陽，利糧道，以戰則利。

ACCESSIBLE TERRAIN

TERRAIN ON WHICH THE ENEMY AND I CAN
BOTH ADVANCE IS CALLED "ACCESSIBLE."




ON THIS KIND OF TERRAIN,
TAKE A POSITION ON SUNNY,
HIGH GROUND ...

WHERE YOU CAN PROTECT
YOUR SUPPLY LINES DURING
BATTLE. THIS IS HOW IT CAN
BE ADVANTAGEOUS.



可以往，難以返，曰挂；挂形者，敵無備，出而勝之；敵若有備，出而不勝，難以返，不利。我出而不利，彼出而不利，曰支；


STEEP TERRAIN
 TERRAIN ON WHICH YOU CAN
 EASILY ADVANCE BUT NOT RETREAT
 IS CALLED "STEEP."




WHEN DOING BATTLE ON THIS KIND OF
 TERRAIN, YOU CAN WIN IF YOU ATTACK
 WHILE THE ENEMY IS STILL UNPREPARED.
 IF YOU ATTACK WHEN THE ENEMY
 IS PREPARED AND YOU
 DON'T WIN ...



RETREAT WILL BE DIFFICULT.
 THIS IS HOW IT CAN BE DISADVANTAGEOUS.



TERRAIN ON WHICH IT IS
 DIFFICULT FOR EITHER SIDE
 TO ADVANCE IS CALLED
 "CONRICTED."



**CONRICTED
 TERRAIN**



ON THIS KIND OF TERRAIN,
EVEN IF THE ENEMY ENTICES
YOU, DO NOT ADVANCE.
INSTEAD, RETREAT, FORCING
HIM TO FOLLOW ...




WAIT UNTIL HALF OF THEM ARE THROUGH,
THEN TURN AND ATTACK.
THIS IS HOW IT CAN BE
ADVANTAGEOUS.




STRATEGIC TERRAIN
BE THE FIRST TO STAND
THE STRATEGIC GROUND.
ESTABLISH A DEFENSE
THERE AND AWAIT
THE ENEMY.



IF HE TAKES THE STRATEGIC GROUND
FIRST AND ESTABLISHES A DEFENSE,
DO NOT FORCE AN ATTACK.



IF HE TAKES THE STRATEGIC
GROUND AND DOES NOT
ESTABLISH A DEFENSE, YOU
MAY CONSIDER ATTACKING.



支形者，敵雖利我，我無出也，引而去之，令敵半出而擊之，利。隘形者，我先居之，必盈之以待敵；若敵先居之，盈而勿從，不盈而從之。

險形者，我先居之，必居高陽以待敵；若敵先居之，引而去之，勿從也。遠形者，勢均，難以挑戰，戰而不利。凡此六者，地之道也，將之至任，不可不察也。



PERILOUS TERRAIN

ON PERILOUS TERRAIN, FIRST STAND THE SUNNY, HIGH GROUND, WHERE YOU WILL AWAIT THE ENEMY.



IF THE ENEMY GETS THERE FIRST, LEAD YOUR TROOPS AWAY. DO NOT ATTACK RECKLESSLY.

TURN
BACK!



SEPARATING TERRAIN

"SEPARATING" TERRAIN REFERS TO TERRAIN ON WHICH IT IS EQUALLY DIFFICULT FOR BOTH FORCES TO ENGAGE. WAGING BATTLE ON THIS TYPE OF TERRAIN IS DISADVANTAGEOUS.

THESE ARE THE SIX KINDS OF TERRAIN AND THE PRINCIPLES FOR USING THEM CORRECTLY. EVERY RESPONSIBLE GENERAL WILL TAKE THEM INTO ACCOUNT.




**THE
SIX
CAUSES
OF
DEFEAT**



THERE ARE SIX CAUSES
OF DEFEAT: HASTE,
LAXITY, DOOM,
COLLAPSE, CHAOS, AND
INCOMPETENCE.

NONE OF THESE IS A
NATURAL DISASTER.
EACH IS THE FAULT
OF THE COMMANDER.



WHEN FORCES ARE EQUAL, AND
INSTEAD OF CONCENTRATING YOUR
MEN IN A DECISIVE ATTACK, YOU
ADVANCE WITH A RATIO OF ONE TO
TEN, THIS IS CALLED "HASTE."



HE'S
COMMITTING
SUICIDE!

WHEN THE SOLDIERS ARE WELL
EQUIPPED AND WELL TRAINED BUT
THEIR OFFICERS ARE WEAK AND
UNSKILLED, THIS IS CALLED "LAXITY."

YOU
GUYS GO
AHEAD AND
ATTACK. I'LL
BE RIGHT
BACK ...



ATTACK!

WHEN THE OFFICERS ARE
SKILLED AND STRONG BUT
THE TROOPS ARE POORLY
EQUIPPED AND POORLY
TRAINED, THIS IS
CALLED "DOOM."



BUT
WE'RE
AFRAID!




故兵有走者，有弛者，有陷者，有崩者，有乱者，有北者。凡此六者，非天之灾，将之过也。夫势均，以一击十，曰走；卒强吏弱，曰弛；吏强卒弱，曰陷；

大吏怒而不服，遇敵懟而自戰，將不知其能，曰崩；將弱不嚴，教道不明，吏卒無常，陳兵縱橫，曰亂；將不能料敵，以少合眾，以弱擊強，兵無選鋒，曰北。凡此六者，敗之道也，將之至任，不可不察也。

WHEN THE HIGH-RANKING OFFICERS DOMINATE AND ATTACK RECKLESSLY, WITH THE COMMANDER UNABLE TO CONTROL THEM, THIS IS CALLED "COLLAPSE."



IF THE COMMANDER IS NOT STRICT OR SKILLED IN TRAINING HIS TROOPS, THE TROOPS HAVE NO DISCIPLINE, AND BATTLE AND DEPLOYMENT ARE DISORGANIZED, THIS IS CALLED "CHAOS."



IF THE COMMANDER DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO EVALUATE THE ENEMY, SETTING A SMALL FORCE AGAINST A LARGER OR A WEAK FORCE AGAINST A STRONGER, OR IF HE DOES NOT EMPLOY SHOCK TROOPS IN THE FRONT RANKS, THIS IS CALLED "INCOMPETENCE."



THESE ARE THE SIX CAUSES OF DEFEAT. IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GENERAL TO TAKE THEM INTO CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.



IT'S ALL MY FAULT THAT WE WERE DEFEATED!



**A GREAT
GENERAL IS
A NATIONAL
TREASURE**




**TERRAIN CAN BE A GREAT ADVANTAGE IN
WAGING WAR. IF YOU CAN USE IT AGAINST THE
ENEMY, YOU ARE ASSURED VICTORY; AND IF
YOU CANNOT, DEFEAT IS CERTAIN.**



**VICTORY IS
CERTAIN!
ALL FORCES
ATTACK!**

**IF A GENERAL IS CERTAIN OF VICTORY,
HE SHOULD RELENTLESSLY ATTACK
UNTIL VICTORY IS GAINED.
IF NOT, HE SHOULD
DISCONTINUE
WAGING WAR.**



**THE GENERAL MAY TEMPORARILY DISREGARD
THE SOVEREIGN'S ORDERS.**

**IF DEFEAT
IS CERTAIN,
WE SHOULD
NOT FIGHT!**

**I
DEMAND
WAR!**



**THE GREAT GENERAL
ADVANCES WITHOUT SEEKING
RECOGNITION AND RETREATS
WITHOUT SHIRKING
RESPONSIBILITY. HIS ONLY GOALS
ARE PROTECTING THE PEOPLE AND
BENEFITTING THE SOVEREIGN.
IN THIS WAY, HE IS A
NATIONAL TREASURE.**




**THE BEST KIND OF
GENERAL IS ONE WHO
NEITHER SEEKS FAME
NOR AVOIDS BLAME
AND WHO TAKES THE
PROTECTION OF THE
PEOPLE AS HIS HIGHEST
PRIORITY.**



夫地形者，兵之助也。料敵制勝，計險阨遠近，上將之道也。知此而用戰者必勝，不知此而用戰者必敗。故戰道必勝，主曰無戰，必戰可也；戰道不勝，主曰必戰，無戰可也。故進不求名，退不避罪，唯人是保，而利合於主，國之寶也。

CHAPTER 11

Ground



STRATEGIES OF GROUND

WHEN SENDING THE MILITARY INTO THE FIELD, THERE ARE NINE KINDS OF GROUND TO CONSIDER: DISPERSIVE, SHALLOW, CONTENTIOUS, PIVOTAL, DEEP, DIFFICULT, ENCIRCLED, AND MORTAL.

IF YOUR ARMY IS BATTLING IN YOUR OWN TERRITORY, THIS IS CALLED "DISPERSIVE GROUND."




IF YOU ENTER A SHORT DISTANCE ACROSS THE BORDER, THIS IS CALLED "SHALLOW GROUND."



WHEN BOTH SIDES HAVE GAINED THE SAME ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION, THIS IS CALLED "CONTENTIOUS GROUND."




WHEN YOU CAN ADVANCE TOWARD THE ENEMY AND THE ENEMY CAN ADVANCE TOWARD YOU, THIS IS CALLED "COMMUNICATING GROUND."



孫子曰：用兵之法：有散地，有輕地，有爭地，有交地，有衢地，有重地，有圯地，有圍地，有死地。諸侯自戰其地，為散地；入人之地而不深者，為輕地；我得則利，彼得亦利者，為爭地；我可以往，彼可以來者，為交地；

諸侯之地三屬，先至而得天下之眾者，為衝地；入人之地深，背城邑多者，為重地；行山林、險阻、沮澤，凡難行之道者，為圯地；所由入者隘，所從歸者迂，彼寡可以擊吾之眾者，為圍地；疾戰則存，不疾戰則亡者，為死地。


WHEN YOU HAVE OCCUPIED A STRATEGIC AREA FROM WHICH YOU CAN CONTROL THE OTHER STATES, THIS IS CALLED "PIVOTAL GROUND."




WHEN YOU ARE FAR INSIDE THE ENEMY'S TERRITORY AND HAVE PASSED SEVERAL TOWNS AND CITIES, THIS IS CALLED "DEEP GROUND."




WHEN YOU ENTER A PASSAGeway THAT IS NARROW, WHERE THE ROAD OF RETREAT IS LONG, OR WHERE YOU CAN BE ATTACKED FROM ALL SIDES, THIS IS CALLED "ENCIRCLED GROUND."




WHEN YOU ARE IN MOUNTAINS, FORESTS, VALLEYS, MARSHES, OR SWAMPS, THIS IS CALLED "DIFFICULT GROUND."




WHEN YOU HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO FIGHT OR DIE, THIS IS CALLED "MORTAL GROUND."




ON DISPERSIVE GROUND, DO NOT ENGAGE THE ENEMY RIGHT AWAY. BEFORE ATTACKING, ENTICE HIM DEEPER INTO YOUR OWN TERRITORY.




ON SHALLOW GROUND, YOU SHOULD NOT HOLD BACK, BUT CONTINUE FIGHTING ON.



IN REGARD TO CONTENTIOUS GROUND, YOU MUST OCCUPY IT FIRST. IF THE ENEMY OCCUPIES IT, DO NOT ATTACK.



WHEN ON COMMUNICATING GROUND, BE SURE AND MAINTAIN YOUR LINES OF SUPPLY AND INFORMATION.




是故散地則無戰，輕地則無止，爭地則無攻，交地則無絕，

衝地則合交，重地則掠，圯地則行，圍地則謀，死地則戰。

WHEN YOU ARE ON PIVOTAL GROUND,
FORM ALLIANCES.



WHEN ON DEEP GROUND, PLUNDER FOR PROVISIONS.




LET'S GO!
THIS IS WHERE WE ARE
MOST VULNERABLE!


WHEN ON DIFFICULT GROUND, MAKE
HASTE TO GET OUT OF IT.




WHEN ON ENCIRCLED GROUND, DEVISE
A STRATEGY TO FREE YOURSELF.



WHEN ON MORTAL GROUND, FIGHT TOOTH AND NAIL.



DIVIDING THE ENEMY



IN ANCIENT TIMES,
THE ABLE MILITARY
COMMANDER KEPT
THE ENEMY FROM
PROTECTING BOTH
HIS FRONT
AND REAR.

HE WOULD CUT OFF THE SMALLER
FORCES FROM THE LARGER
SO THAT THEY WOULD BE
ISOLATED AND COULD NOT
COME TO EACH OTHER'S AID.



HE WOULD KEEP THEM
FROM CHANGING POSITION
OR CONCENTRATING THEIR
STRENGTH IN ATTACK.

ONLY ACT WHEN IN AN
ADVANTAGEOUS POSITION;
WHEN IN A DISADVANTAGEOUS
POSITION, DON'T DO
ANYTHING RASH.



所謂古之善用兵者，能使敵人前後不相及，眾寡不相恃，貴賤不相救，上下不相收，卒離而不集，兵合而不齊。
合於利而動，不合於利而止。

敢問敵眾整而將來，待之若何？曰：先奪其所愛，則聽矣。
兵之情，主速乘人之不及，由不虞之道，攻其所不戒也。

WHAT SHOULD WE DO IF THE
ENEMY IS STRONG AND THEY
ATTACK US IN ORGANIZED
FORMATIONS?

FIRST, WE ATTACK WHAT
IS MOST STRATEGICALLY
IMPORTANT TO THE
ENEMY. THIS WILL PUT
HIM UNDER OUR
CONTROL.

THE MOST IMPORTANT THING
AT THE OPENING OF BATTLE
IS TO BE FAST, TO CATCH
THE ENEMY OFF GUARD.

FOLLOW A ROAD THAT
THE ENEMY WOULD NOT
EXPECT YOU TO FOLLOW
AND ATTACK A PLACE
THAT THEY ARE NOT
DEFENDING.

**THE
ARMY
OF THE
SUPREME
SOVEREIGN**





ONE WHO DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE INTENTIONS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO EFFECTIVELY MAKE USE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

SORRY, BUT OUR COUNTRY'S POLICY HAS SUDDENLY CHANGED. MY APOLOGIES ...



ONE WHO DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THE TERRAIN OF MOUNTAINS, FORESTS, VALLEYS, MARSHES, AND SWAMPS WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LEAD TROOPS INTO BATTLE.

ONE WHO DOES NOT USE THE LOCALS AS GUIDES WON'T GAIN THE ADVANTAGES THAT THE TERRAIN HAS TO OFFER.




IF A GENERAL LACKS ANY OF THE ABOVE CHARACTERISTICS, HIS ARMY CANNOT BE CALLED THE ARMY OF THE SUPREME SOVEREIGN.



是故不知諸侯之謀者，不能預交；不知山林險阻沮澤之形者，不能行軍；不用鄉導者，不能得地利。四五者，不知一，非霸王之兵也。


故善用兵者，譬如率然；率然者，常山之蛇也，擊其首則尾至，擊其尾則首至，擊其中則首尾俱至。敢問兵可使如率然乎？曰：可。



FOR INSTANCE, SUPPOSE THERE WERE TWO MEN, ONE FROM WU AND ONE FROM YUE, WHO WERE ENEMIES ...



NOW, IF THEY HAPPENED TO BE ON THE SAME BOAT IN THE EVENT OF A TERRIBLE STORM, THEY WOULD BECOME LIKE THE LEFT AND RIGHT HANDS OF THE SAME PERSON, HELPING EACH OTHER OUT OF DIFFICULTY.




SO, EVEN STRINGING HORSES TOGETHER, BURYING CHARIOT WHEELS IN THE DIRT, AND FORCING SOLDIERS TO MARCH IN UNISON CANNOT BE COUNTED ON TO CREATE COOPERATION AMONG THE SOLDIERS.



YOU MUST MOTIVATE THE SOLDIERS TO FIGHT WITH BRAVERY AND UNITY, GIVE THEM THE DISCIPLINE TO FOLLOW COMMANDS, AND MAKE BOTH THE STRONG AND WEAK GIVE THEIR ALL.


YOU MUST ALSO UNDERSTAND GEOGRAPHICAL CONDITIONS AND USE THEM TO YOUR ADVANTAGE.



夫吳人與越人相惡也，當其同舟而濟，遇風，其相救也如左右手。是故方馬埋輪，未足恃也；齊勇若一，政之道也；剛柔皆得，地之理也。



故善用兵者，攜手若使一人，不得已也。

FOR AN ABLE MILITARY COMMANDER, DIRECTING THE OPERATIONS OF AN ENTIRE ARMY IS LIKE DIRECTING THE ACTIONS OF ONE PERSON ...



THE GREAT COMMANDER OF A LARGE FORCE IS ABLE TO RALLY HIS SOLDIERS TO ACT WITH ONE MIND, GOING THROUGH THICK AND THIN, AND HELPING EACH OTHER OUT OF TROUBLE. HE DOES THIS BY PLACING THEM ON "MORTAL GROUND," THUS GIVING THEM NO CHOICE BUT TO FIGHT OR DIE.






是故始如處女，敵人開戶；後如脫兔，敵不及拒。

CHAPTER 12

Incendiary Warfare



**FIVE
METHODS OF
INCENDIARY
WARFARE**



THERE ARE FIVE METHODS OF ATTACKING THE ENEMY WITH FIRE:
SET FIRE DIRECTLY TO THE ENEMY FOOT SOLDIERS.
SET FIRE TO THE ENEMY'S STOCKPILE OF GRAIN.
SET FIRE TO THE ENEMY'S SUPPLY WAGONS.
SET FIRE TO THE ENEMY'S STORES OF EQUIPMENT.
SET FIRE TO THE ENEMY'S TUNNELS.



THE CONDITIONS MUST BE
RIGHT TO INITIATE AN
INCENDIARY ATTACK, AND
ONE MUST ALREADY HAVE
THE RIGHT EQUIPMENT
AT HAND.



WHEN ATTACKING WITH FIRE,
YOU MUST DO SO AT AN
ADVANTAGEOUS TIME ON AN
ADVANTAGEOUS DAY.



"AT AN ADVANTAGEOUS
TIME" MEANS THAT THE
WEATHER MUST BE DRY
AND THE PLACE IN
QUESTION MUST HAVE
GONE WITHOUT RAIN
FOR A PERIOD
OF TIME.




"ON AN ADVANTAGEOUS
DAY" MEANS A DAY WHEN
THE MOON IS FOUND IN THE
CONSTELLATION OF
SAGITTARIUS, PEGASUS,
CRATER, OR CORVUS,
WHICH WILL BE A DAY
OF RISING WIND.



孫子曰：凡火攻有五：一曰火人，二曰火積，三曰火輜，四曰火庫，五曰火隊。行火必有因，煙火必素具。發火有時，起火有日。時者，天之燥也；日者，月在箕壁翼軫也，凡此四宿者，風起之日也。

非利不動，非得不用，非危不戰。主不可以怒而興師，將不可以愠而致戰。合於利而動，不合於利而止。

MOVE ONLY WHEN IT BENEFITS YOU



IN WAR, YOU MUST WIN; IN ATTACKING, YOU MUST TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

IF IT IS NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE COUNTRY, DO NOT TAKE ACTION.

IF YOU CANNOT WIN, DO NOT GO TO WAR.

IF YOU ARE NOT IN DANGER, DO NOT FIGHT.




THE KING MUST NOT INITIATE WAR DUE TO MOMENTARY ANGER.



LIKewise, THE GENERAL MUST NOT ATTACK THE ENEMY JUST BECAUSE HE IS UPSET ABOUT SOMETHING.



YOU MUST ACT ACCORDING TO WHAT BENEFITS THE COUNTRY. IF IT IS NOT BENEFICIAL TO THE COUNTRY, HALT ACTIVITY.



FOR ANGER CAN
BECOME HAPPINESS,
AND INDIGNATION CAN
BECOME JOY.

BUT ONCE THE COUNTRY IS
LOST, THERE IS NO WAY TO
BRING IT BACK; AND ONCE A
LIFE IS LOST, THERE IS NO
WAY TO REVIVE IT.



THEREFORE, AN INTELLIGENT SOVEREIGN WILL WEIGH HEAVILY HIS
CHOICE OF ENGAGING IN WAR, AND AN OUTSTANDING GENERAL
WILL USE HIS FORCES WITH CAUTION.



THIS IS THE FOUNDATION FOR
MAINTAINING A PEACEFUL
COUNTRY AND GUARANTEEING
THE INTEGRITY
OF THE MILITARY.




THE SOVEREIGN
MUST CAREFULLY
CONSIDER ANY
DECISION
TO DECLARE WAR
BECAUSE THE LIVES
OF THE PEOPLE, AS
WELL AS THE
COUNTRY, HANG IN
THE BALANCE.



怒可以復喜，
慍可以復悅，
亡國不可以復存，
死者不可以復生。
故明君慎之，
良將警之，
此安國全軍之道也。


CHAPTER 13

Espionage



SPIES

IN ANY WAR INVOLVING 100,000 TROOPS TRAVELING HUNDREDS OF MILES, THE EXPENSE INFLECTED ON THE PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY WILL AMOUNT TO AN ENORMOUS NUMBER.



THERE WILL BE UPEHAVAL FROM THE CITY TO THE COUNTRYSIDE. PEOPLE WILL BE EXHAUSTED ON THE ROADS, AND ORDINARY JOBS WILL GO UNDONE, TOTALING UPWARDS OF 700,000 PEOPLE AFFECTED.




A WAR BETWEEN US AND OUR ENEMY WILL BE WAGED FOR YEARS, ONLY TO BE FINALLY DECIDED AT THE LAST MOMENT ...



IF YOU DO NOT HAVE GOOD INTELLIGENCE REPORTS DUE TO STINGY SALARIES AND EMOLUMENTS AND YOU ARE DEFEATED BECAUSE OF IT, THAT IS ABJECT CRUELTY.




THIS KIND OF PERSON IS NOT A GOOD COMMANDER OF TROOPS, IS NOT AN AID TO HIS COUNTRY, AND WILL NEVER BECOME A VICTORIOUS SUPREME COMMANDER!



孫子曰：凡興師十萬，出征千里，百姓之費，公家之奉，日費千金，內外騷動，怠於道路，不得操事者七十萬家，相守數年，以爭一日之勝，而愛爵祿百金，不知敵之情者，不仁之至也，非人之將也，非主之佐也，非勝之主也。

故明君賢將，所以動而勝人，成功出於眾者，先知也。先知者，不可取於鬼神，不可象於事，不可驗於度，必取於人知敵之情者也。




THE FIVE AGENTS


THERE ARE FIVE KINDS OF INTELLIGENCE AGENTS:
VILLAGE AGENTS
INTERNAL AGENTS
DOUBLE AGENTS
EXPENDABLE AGENTS
SURVIVING AGENTS




WHEN THESE FIVE KINDS OF AGENTS ARE USED TOGETHER, THEY ARE UNFATHOMABLE TO THE ENEMY, AND THE RESULTS ARE NOTHING SHORT OF MIRACULOUS. THEY ARE NATIONAL TREASURES.



THE VILLAGE AGENT IS A VILLAGER IN THE ENEMY COUNTRY.




THE INTERNAL AGENT IS A MINISTER OF THE ENEMY'S GOVERNMENT.




故用間有五：有因間，有內間，有反間，有死間，有生間。五間俱起，莫知其道，是謂神紀，人君之寶也。
因間者，因其鄉人而用之；內間者，因其官人而用之；

反間者，因其敵間而用之；死間者，為誑事於外，令吾間知之，而傳於敵間也；生間者，反報也。
故三軍之事，莫親於間，賞莫厚於間，事莫密於間。

THE DOUBLE AGENT IS A SPY FOR THE ENEMY THAT WE HAVE TURNED AGAINST THEM.



THE EXPENDABLE AGENT PASSES DISINFORMATION TO THE ENEMY AND IS NOT EXPECTED TO RETURN.



OKAY, I'LL TALK. I'LL TALK. I'LL TELL YOU EVERYTHING ...


THE SURVIVING AGENT RETURNS TO GIVE A REPORT.



OF THOSE WHO ARE FAVORED IN THE MILITARY, NO ONE IS MORE FAVORED THAN A SPY;




NO ONE IS MORE HIGHLY REWARDED;



HIS SALARY IS WAY MORE THAN OURS ...

AND NO ONE'S ACTIONS ARE MORE SECRET THAN A SPY'S.



WHERE'D HE GO?

ONLY A WISE COMMANDER CAN
USE SPIES PROPERLY.



ONLY A BENEVOLENT COMMANDER
CAN CONTROL SPIES.



ONLY THE MOST PERCEPTIVE
COMMANDER CAN TELL IF A
SPY'S REPORT IS TRUE
OR NOT.



WONDERFUL! SIMPLY WONDERFUL!
A SPY CAN BE USED ANYWHERE.




HOWEVER, IF AN ESPIONAGE OPERATION IS
EXPOSED, BOTH THE SPY AND THE PERSON
WHO EXPOSED HIM MUST DIE.



非聖智不能用間，非仁義不能使間，非微妙不能得間之實。微哉，微哉，無所不用間也。間事未發而先聞者，間與所告者皆死。

凡軍之所欲擊，城之所欲攻，人之所欲殺，必先知其守將、左右、謁者、門者、舍人之姓名，令吾間必索知之。
 必索敵人之間來間我者，因而利之，導而舍之，故反間可得而用也；
 因是而知之，故死間為誑事，可使告敵；
 因是而知之，故生間可使如期。
 五間之事，主必知之，知之必在於反間，
 故反間不可不厚也。





IN THE PAST, THE REASON FOR THE
RISE OF THE SHANG DYNASTY WAS
THAT YI YIN HAD BEEN A MINISTER
FOR THE PRECEDING XIA DYNASTY.



THE REASON FOR THE RISE OF THE
ZHOU DYNASTY WAS THAT JIANG
SHANG HAD BEEN A MINISTER
FOR THE PRECEDING SHANG DYNASTY.



SO WE CAN SEE THAT FOR AN INTELLIGENT KING AND
GENERAL TO EFFECTIVELY EMPLOY WISE AND ABLE
PEOPLE AS SPIES WILL BRING CERTAIN SUCCESS.



THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL STEP OF ANY MILITARY CAMPAIGN.
THE ENTIRE ARMY DEPENDS ON THE INFORMATION
PROVIDED THROUGH ESPIONAGE AND CANNOT
MOVE WITHOUT IT.



昔殷之興也，伊摯在夏；周之興也，呂牙在殷。故惟明君賢將，能以上智為間者，必成大功。此兵之要，三軍之所恃而動也。

Pronunciation Index

There are different systems of Romanization of Chinese words, but in all of these systems the sounds of the letters used do not necessarily correspond to those sounds which we are accustomed to using in English (for instance, would you have guessed that zh is pronounced like j as in “jelly”—not as in “je ne sais quoi”?). Of course, these systems can be learned, but to save some time and effort for the reader who is not a student of Chinese, we have provided the following pronunciation guide. The Chinese words appear on the left as they do in the text and are followed by their pronunciations. Just sound out the pronunciations as you would for an unfamiliar English word, and you will be quite close to the proper Mandarin pronunciation.

In addition, Chinese philosophical terms have been defined, and page numbers have been provided where every glossed term appears in the book.

NOTES

–dz is a combination of a d and a z in one sound, without the ee sound at the end; so it sounds kind of like a bee in flight with a slight d sound at the beginning.

–zh is pronounced like the j in “jelly” and not like the j in “je ne sais quoi.”

Bingfa 兵法 (principles and tactics of warfare): beeng-faw 2, 53
Boju 柏舉: bwo (o as in more)–jew (ew as in few) vii

Chu 楚: choo vii, viii, 9

Da Xue 大學: daw shweh xii

Dao 道 (moral cause): dow viii, 12, 13, 18
Daodejing 道德經: dow-du (u as in pull)–jeeng xii

ge 戈: gu (u as in pull) xiii

Han 漢: hon (as in honcho) xi

Han Feizi 韓非子: hon (as in honcho) fay-dz xii

Helü 閭廬: hu (u as in pull)–lew (ew as in few) vii, 2, 9

Jiang Shang 姜尚: jyong shong 125

Jin 晉: jeen 9

Kongzi 孔子: kong (long o)–dz 2

Laozi 老子: lou (as in lounge)–dz xii

Liezi 列子: lyeh-dz xii

Mao Zedong 毛澤東: mou (as in mouse) dzu (u as in pull)–dong
(long o) viii

Ming 明: meeng xi

Mengzi 孟子: mung-dz 2

Qi 齊: chee xi, 2, 9

Qin 秦: cheen xi

Qing 清: cheeng xi

Quan Rong 犬戎: chwen rong (long o)

Shang 商: shong xi

Shen 申: shun xi

Shenzong 神宗: shun dzong (long o) vii

shi 勢 (force, momentum): shir xiv, 59–62, 68, 98

shu 術 (technique, method): shoo xiii

Shuairan 率然: shrigh (rhymes with high)–rawn 110

Song 宋: song (long o) vii, xi, xii

Sun Wu 孫武: swoon (oo as in book)-oo 2

Sunzi 孫子: swoon (oo as in book)-dz vii–ix, xii–xv, 1–3, 6, 8, 9, 24

Tang 唐: tong xi

Tsai, Chih-chung 蔡志忠: tsigh (rhymes with high) jir-jong (long o) vii, xii–xv

wen 文 (culture, morality): wun xiii–xv

wu 武 (pertaining to warfare or combat): oo xiii–xv

Wu 吳: oo vii, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 111

Xia 夏: shyaw 125

xing 形 (shape, form, formation, tactical disposition): sheeng xiv, 54, 56, 66–68, 74, 81, 95–98, 101, 109

Xuan Gong 宣公: shwen gong (long o) xiii

Yi Yin 伊尹: ee-eeng 125

Yijing 易經: ee-jeeng xiv

Ying 郢: eeng 9

Yuan 元: ywen xi

Yue 越: yweh 111

Zengzi 曾子: dzung-dz xii

zhi 止: jir xiii

Zhong Yong 中庸: jong (long o) yong (long o) xii

Zhou 周: joe xi

Zhuangzi 莊子: jwong-dz xii, 2

Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮: joo-gu (u as in pull) lyong xiv
zi 子: dz 2

Zisi 子思: dz-sz xii

Zuo Zhuan 左傳: dzuo (o as in more) jwon xii